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Product liability-“private use” and “proximity” present problems  
Eleanor J Russell 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
The author reviews the law on product liability both at common law 
and under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 with a particular focus 
on the recent decision in Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Limited 
[2015] CSOH 173.  
 
Introduction 
Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31, 1932 S.L.T. 317, which 
is undoubtedly the most celebrated case in the law of delict, was a 
case which arose in the context of product liability. While, at a general 
level, the case is famous for Lord Atkin’s formulation of the 
neighbourhood test in respect of the duty of care analysis (the “broad” 
ratio), at a more specific level Donoghue established that a 
manufacturer of a product owes a duty of care to the end user in 
circumstances where the product is intended to reach the end user in 
the form it which it left the manufacturer and where there is no 
opportunity for intermediate inspection. This “narrow” ratio is stated 
by Lord Atkin in the following terms (1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31 at 57, 1932 
S.L.T. 317 at 331): 
“[B]y Scots and English law alike a manufacturer of products, which 
he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the 
ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no 
reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the 
knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or 
putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life 
or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable 
care.” 
The common law on product liability, as set out in Donoghue, has not 
been free from difficulty. It has been stated that “[t]he principal and 
obvious shortcoming of the traditional Donoghue v Stevenson cause 
of action is the need to prove fault.” (JF Clerk & WHB Lindsell, Torts 
(21st edn, A Dugdale, M Jones and MA Simpson eds, Thomson/ 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at para.11-45). The learned authors do state 
however that this shortcoming should perhaps not be overplayed 
given that the difficulty in many product liability cases is not so much 
proof of fault as proof of causation.  
Nonetheless, proof of fault is not always easy to establish. Where 
there are two possible wrongdoers and the pursuer cannot establish 
which one is at fault, his action is bound to fail. This problem can 
arise in relation to a complex product which is comprised of 
components made by several persons. In Evans v Triplex Safety 
Glass Co Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 283 the plaintiff was injured when he 
was showered with glass, the windscreen of his car having 
disintegrated. The manufacturer of the car had fitted the windscreen 
but the windscreen itself had been manufactured by the defendant. 
The plaintiff’s action was dismissed as he was unable to establish 
whether the incident resulted from careless fitting of the windscreen 
(by the car manufacturer) or whether it resulted from negligence on 
the part of the manufacturer of the windscreen. 
The deficiencies of the common law of negligence in this field were 
perhaps most starkly highlighted by the thalidomide tragedy. It was 
alleged that use of the drug resulted in deformities in some babies 
born to women who had taken it during pregnancy. Although the 
various claims in the UK were ultimately settled extra judicially, it is 
widely thought that the claimants would have experienced 
considerable difficulty in establishing fault against the manufacturer of 
the drug.  
In many (but not all) cases involving product liability the need to prove 
fault has now been removed as a result of the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987 Pt 1. The Act introduced a statutory scheme of strict liability 
in respect of defective products. The impetus for the legislation came 
from Europe in the shape of EC Directive No 85/374/EEC. The 1987 
Act implements that Directive and s.1(1) of the Act provides that the 
Act should be interpreted to comply with the Directive. The 1987 Act 
came into force on 1 March 1988. Its provisions have been described 
as “hideously complex” (J Thomson, Delictual Liability (Bloomsbury, 
5th edn, 2014) at p.180) and only a brief overview is given here. (For 
a more detailed account of the law, see the discussion by Professor 
McManus in Thomson, ed. Delict (SULI/W Green, 2007), Ch.16.)  
Primary responsibility under the Act is imposed upon the producer of 
the product. Section 2(1) of the Act provides that where any damage 
is caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product, every person to 
whom s.2(2) applies shall be liable for the damage. Section 2(2) goes 
on to identify those persons as: 
“(a) the producer of the product; 
(b) any person who, by putting his name on the product or using a 
trade mark or other distinguishing mark in relation to the product, has 
held himself out to be the producer of the product; 
(c) any person who has imported the product into a member State 
from a place outside the member States in order, in the course of any 
business of his, to supply it to another.” 
A supplier may incur liability where he fails to identify the producer or 
his own supplier within a reasonable period following a request to do 
so (s.2(3)). Liability under the Act is strict: “defectiveness, not fault, is 
the criterion of recovery” (JF Clerk & WHB Lindsell, Torts, supra, at 
para.11-48). Strict liability is imposed “where any damage is caused 
wholly or partly by a defect in a product”  (s.2(1)). A “product” is 
defined (in s.1(2)) as “any goods or electricity” and, importantly, 
includes components and raw materials which are part of a complex 
product (thus obviating the difficulty which was encountered in Evans 
above- both the car and the windscreen would now be viewed as 
products under the Act.) “Damage” is defined as “death or personal 
injury or any loss of or damage to property (including land)” (s.5(1)). 
Recovery is therefore excluded in respect of pure economic loss. A 
product is defective if its safety “is not such as persons generally are 
entitled to expect” (s.3(1)). In other words, a “consumer expectation” 
test applies-see Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd [2001] TLR 136; A v 
National Blood Authority (No 1) [2001] 3 All ER 289 (members of the 
public were entitled to expect that blood transfused to them would be 
free from infection). Liability under the Act is not absolute. Indeed, the 
Act sets out a number of defences upon which the defender may 
seek to rely (see s.4) including the somewhat controversial 
“development risk” defence (s.4(1)(e)). Section 6(4) makes separate 
provision for the defence of contributory negligence. 
The Act is not comprehensive in its scope. Damage to certain types 
of property is excluded from its ambit. Among those exclusions are 
damage to the defective product itself (s.5(2)) and property damaged 
or lost as a result of the defective product, where such loss or 
damage does not exceed £275 in value (s.5(4)). Of particular 
significance to the present discussion is a further exception stated in 
s.5(3), that being property damaged or lost as a result of a defective 
product where the property damaged or lost is not for private use. 
Professor Thomson provides the following example: “”[I]f A produces 
a defective vacuum cleaner, the Act will apply if the cleaner damages 
the carpet in B’s home but not if it damages the carpet in B’s office or 
factory.”  (J Thomson, Delictual Liability (Bloomsbury, 5th edn, 2014) 
at p.182). If the Act has no application on account of the fact that the 
property damaged is not for private use, the pursuer must instead rely 
on the common law, which will of course require him or her to 
establish that a duty of care is owed in respect of the loss suffered 
and also that that loss has been caused by fault on the defender’s 
part.   
Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Limited [2015] CSOH 173- the 
alleged facts  
Against that background, attention is now turned to the alleged facts 
in the recent case of Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy Limited [2015] 
CSOH 173. The club raised an action of damages against Motocaddy 
Limited, a company which both imports and supplies electric golf 
trolleys. The company markets the trolleys under its own name in the 
United Kingdom. The pursuer sought £558000 in damages. The 
losses were said to arise from extensive damage caused to the 
pursuer’s clubhouse in the early hours of 24 July 2010, when a 
Motocaddy S1 electric golf trolley caught fire. The trolley had been 
left in a locker room by a club member, Darryn Grant, on the previous 
evening after he had used it during a round of golf. He left it with the 
rocker switch - which controlled the power supply - in the "on" 
position, meaning it was still energised. Mr. Grant had owned the 
trolley for more than two years. He had replaced the original battery 
(which had been supplied with the trolley) with a 36-hole battery 
because the original battery had stopped working. The most probable 
seat of the fire was the trolley. The most likely cause of a fire within 
an energised trolley was an electrical fault in the wiring or wired 
connections to the trolley proximate to the battery. The club framed 
its action against Motocaddy Limited both under the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 and in negligence. The defender stated a plea to 
the relevancy of the pursuer’s pleadings in respect of both grounds of 
action and the case came to debate on the procedure roll before Lord 
Philip. Following debate, Lord Philip dismissed the action. How then 
did his Lordship reach his conclusion?  
The statutory ground of action 
The pursuer asserted that the defender, having held itself out as 
producer of the trolley and in its capacity as importer of the trolley 
was liable for the damage caused by the trolley in terms of s.2(2)(b) 
and (c) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. The trolley was 
“defective” as there was no over-temperature cut-off to prevent power 
transistor failure and no short circuit protection. The defender 
submitted, however, that in view of s.5(3)(a) and (b) of the 1987 Act, 
it was not liable for the pursuer’s loss, since the property damaged 
could not be described as property ordinarily intended by the 
pursuers for private use, occupation or consumption, nor was it 
intended by the pursuers mainly for their own private use, occupation 
or consumption. Rather, the clubhouse was used for economic 
activity. The pursuer submitted that liability was not excluded by 
s.5(3). It contended that the clubhouse did constitute private premises 
and was the equivalent of residential property. The fact that the club 
permitted visitors to use its facilities did not make the club an 
economic entity, but simply indicated a desire to boost club income.  
It is useful here to set out the terms of s.5(3) of the 1987 Act: 
“A person shall not be liable under section 2 …for any loss of or 
damage to any property which, at the time it is lost or damaged, is 
not— 
(a) of a description of property ordinarily intended for private use, 
occupation or consumption; and 
(b) intended by the person suffering the loss or damage mainly for his 
own private use, occupation or consumption.” 
In addressing the arguments, Lord Philip emphasised (at para.15) 
that the pursuers would only be entitled to succeed if their pleadings 
demonstrated that both limbs of the above test were satisfied. (Clerk 
and Lindsell  (supra) describe them as “cumulative requirements” at 
para 11-81). Acknowledging that the parties were clearly in dispute as 
to the correct meaning of the term “private”, Lord Philip declared that 
he was not prepared to hold that the use made of the clubhouse was 
“private” in terms of s.5(3) simply because it was owned by the 
members of a club. Instead, the actual use to which the clubhouse 
was put required to be examined. His Lordship observed that a 
member could introduce guests to play golf and to use the clubhouse 
facilities. In addition, members of the public could play golf for a fee, 
use the clubhouse, and patronise the bar and the catering 
facilities. Although the catering facilities were franchised to a local 
business, the club benefitted from the profits from the licensed 
bar. The lounge and dining area were available for social functions 
which were not necessarily related to the club. Bookings for such 
functions required to be made by a member and a fee was charged 
for such bookings. The club’s action for damages included claims in 
respect of business interruption, loss of green fees, and loss of profit 
from bar takings. 
 
His Lordship stated (at para.18): 
“In the light of these facts it is clear from the pursuers’ averments that 
the clubhouse, in common with many golf clubhouses, was used for a 
material amount of economic or commercial activity. Moreover, I am 
unable to accept that Parliament intended that a building, the use of 
which was available to seven hundred members as well as others, 
could be described as being subject only to private use. In these 
circumstances I do not consider that the clubhouse was of a 
description of property ordinarily intended for private use or 
occupation.”    
Given that both legs of the test in s.5(3) required to be satisfied, Lord 
Philip’s conclusion that the first leg of the test was not satisfied was 
sufficient to allow him to dispose of the pursuer’s statutory case as 
irrelevant. His Lordship did observe, however, that the pursuer’s 
argument in favour of private use under the second part of the test 
(namely that the clubhouse was intended by the pursuer mainly for its 
own private use and occupation) was stronger than the argument in 
respect of the first limb. 
The common law ground of action  
Having thus disposed of the pursuer’s statutory case, Lord Philip 
turned his attention to the common law ground of action. In this 
connection it was averred that the defender had failed in its duty to 
carry out a “reasonable examination” of the trolley, which would have 
included a visual inspection and an electrical inspection to ensure 
that the trolley incorporated adequate protection against incendive 
electrical faults.  This aspect of the case raised the issue of the 
scope of the defender’s duty of care to the pursuer. His Lordship 
observed (at para.19) that “[t]hat issue essentially falls to be 
determined by the application of the tripartite test set out in Caparo 
Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.” The tripartite approach in 
Caparo requires an analysis of issues of foreseeability, proximity and 
policy (the third issue involves asking whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defender). 
Taking each one of the three elements of the tripartite test in turn, 
and dealing first with the question of foreseeability, counsel for the 
defender submitted that the pursuer had failed to aver sufficient 
foreseeability. While counsel accepted that it was foreseeable that if a 
trolley caught fire some damage might be caused, he submitted that 
in this case it was not foreseeable that damage to any third party 
would be involved. Counsel for the pursuer, however, contended that 
the foreseeability of the trolley catching fire was a matter for 
evidence. In the event, Lord Philip did not find it necessary to express 
a concluded view on foreseeability in light of the view which he 
adopted on the question of proximity. 
On that second element of the tripartite approach, (namely proximity) 
the defender again submitted that the pursuer’s common law case 
was irrelevant owing to a failure to aver sufficient proximity. The 
pursuer sought to take liability for property damage beyond the 
consumer of the product and this was a leap, counsel submitted, 
which the court was not obliged to take. There was a great distance 
between the defender’s alleged failure and the fire. Lord Philip 
acknowledged that the proximity aspect of the duty enquiry presented 
“greater difficulties” for the pursuer. His Lordship stated: (at para.20): 
“[T]here were a large number of factors leading to the fire over which 
the defenders had no control. It is averred that the fire was caused as 
the result of the rocker switch being left in the “on” position.  The 
precise mechanics of the cause of the fire are however uncertain. It is 
not averred that the wires were actually damaged prior to the fire, 
merely that they could have been. The defenders had no control over 
the maintenance of the trolley, or over the use of the trolley in the 
three years since it came into the owner’s possession. The owner 
had changed the battery to a 36 hole battery. The capacity of the 
previous battery is not averred. The defenders had no control over 
the place where the trolley was left on the night in question. The 
pursuers do not aver from whom the owner obtained the trolley.” 
 
His Lordship continued (at para.21): 
“ As Lord Hodge pointed out in ICL Tech Limited v Johnston Oils 
Limited [2013] SLT 1090 at 199: 
“In Donoghue v Stevenson Lord Atkin famously emphasised 
the concept of direct effect in his definition of proximity. He 
spoke of ‘such close and direct relations that the act 
complained of directly affects a person whom the person 
alleged to be bound to take care would know would be 
directly affected by his act.’”  
He went on to cite Lord Hoffmann in Sutradhar v Natural Environment 
Research Council [2006] UKHL 33 where he spoke of the need for 
the person on whom a duty of care was imposed to have “a measure 
of control over and responsibility for the potentially dangerous 
situation” and for “a proximate relationship with a source of danger”.”   
 
In relation to this aspect of the duty enquiry, Lord Philip expressed 
agreement with the defender’s submission that there was “a great 
distance” between the defender’s alleged failure and the fire. His 
Lordship concluded that the pursuer had not succeeded in averring 
sufficient proximity between the defender and pursuer.  
 
On the third aspect of the Caparo tripartite approach, the defender 
submitted that it would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose a duty 
of care of the kind averred as that would involve the imposition of 
liability to anyone whose property happened to be adjacent to the 
defective product. Accordingly, the defender’s duty would be to check 
the product for the benefit of the world, creating a risk over which it 
had no control. Lord Philip, “taking a general view of the entire 
circumstances” and for the same reasons which he had expressed in 
relation to his rejection of the proximity criterion, concluded (at 
para.21) that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose a 
duty of care on the defender in the instant case. Accordingly, the 
action was dismissed. 
 
Conclusion  
When the Consumer Protection Act 1987 came into force on 1 March 
1988 it addressed one of the key shortcomings of the common law of 
negligence in that it dispensed with the need to prove fault in relation 
to certain product liability claims. Although recovery under the 1987 
Act is “uncomplicated by the need to prove negligence” (McManus, 
Delict (SULI/W Green, 2007), supra, at para.16.29), it must be 
remembered that the Act is not comprehensive in its scope. Liability 
in respect of property damage under the Act is restricted in a number 
of important ways. Thus, recovery is precluded under the strict 
statutory regime in respect of property damage claims of under £275 
in value and in respect of damage to property which is not for “private 
use”. Renfrew Golf Club provides an illuminating discussion of the 
latter restriction and, in so doing, serves as a reminder of the limited 
ambit of the 1987 Act. The statutory scheme cannot therefore be 
regarded as a universal panacea. Reliance may still require to be 
placed in some cases upon the common law of negligence, where 
proof of fault remains fundamental. Although the pursuer in Renfrew 
Golf Club did advance a common law case (in addition to its statutory 
case) that too was destined for failure on account of the club’s 
inability to demonstrate that the defender owed it a duty of care. 
Pivotal in sealing the pursuer’s fate on that front was the lack of 
proximity between the parties to the litigation. The Lord Ordinary also 
took the view that the imposition of a duty would not, in the 
circumstances, be fair, just and reasonable. The common law 
therefore proved impotent to plug the gap left by the Consumer 
Protection Act in the circumstances of this particular case with the 
result that Renfrew Golf Club was ultimately denied a remedy. Golf 
clubs across the country should take note of this important decision. 
 
